

-

\*

가

가

3

1 3  
가

가

# I.

(school-to-work)

가

가

(productivity)

, 가

가

가

.1)

가

(imperfect

information, market uncertainty)

1)

(2000),

(1997)

(1994),

(1999),

( )  
가 (e.g., Spence[1974]

[market signaling], Schwab Rynes & Aldag[1987]  
Barron & Bishop[1985]

가 , (market)"  
가 가 ,  
(Granovetter, 1973, 1974, 1985).

(worker-job matching), (social network) (job-search), (matching quality)  
(intensity), (size) (strength)가

( , 2000)

1981) Lin(1982) (Lin, Ensel & Vaughn, Granovetter(1973, 1974, 1982)  
(strength) (size), (density), (centrality) ( , 1999;  
, 2000) 가 가

--

--

(constraints) ,  
(choice behavior)  
가 " (a structural constraint model of job search)"

(constrained) 가  
( ) , 가

## II.

### 1.

“ (Hammermash, 1987) 가 (utility maximization) (human capital theory) (marginal productivity) (Becker, 1975: 39-40) (job searcher)가 (cost) (return) 가 (expected return) 가 가 Stigler(1961) (sequential search model) , (1) 가 (wage offer distribution) (2) (offer arrival rate), (3) 가 (reservation wage) (after initial search) 가 가 “ 가? 가?” (Mortenson, 1986; Lippman and McCall, 1976; McKenna: 1985). 가 가 (minimally acceptable wage) 가 (expected present value of return) 가 가

가 / ( )

) 가 ( , )

) 가 (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997[1999]; 624- 625).

가 , (expected return)

가 . (reservation)

. Halaby(1988; 10- 11) , (1)

(2) (reservation

wage - wage offer)

가 , (transfer cost)

, 가 . Mortenson(1986)

.: 1) (offer arrival)

가 . 2)

. 3)

. 4) (variance)가 (interest rate)

.

, 가 (Lee, 1993: 18).

가 . 1)

, 가 가?; 2)

가?

-- ( - )--

. 가

.

가

.

---

2) 가 가

, 가 가

(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997[1999]; 626- 627).

, 가 McKenna(1985: 10- 11) .

(job search assistance)

(Lurie and Rayayck, 1968; Reynolds, 1951; Ullman and Taylor, 1965).

(Rees and Shultz, 1970)

(two-stage) (extensive search) 가 (intensive search) (quality) 가 가 (screening) 가 (Montgomery, 1991) 가 (true productivity) 가 가 가

2. :

(social capital) Coleman(1988: 98) : 1) 가 . 2) 가 -- 가 -- . 3) 가 “ . ” 3)

---

3) (information), (control), (solidarity) (Sandefur & Lauman, 1999). 가 , 가 , ( , 1999: 791) “ , , ”

“  
 ”(Granovetter, 1974)  
 가 ,  
 (social network)  
 가  
 (Granovetter, 1974; 1982). ,  
 (stylized)  
 , ,  
 (productivity) (skill level)  
 ,  
 (problem of embeddedness)  
 ( , ) ( , )  
 Granovetter (weak ties)가  
 (Granovetter, 1973,  
 1974). , 1) 가 ( , , , )  
 )  
 ; 2) (strong ties. , 가 , , )  
 (weak ties. 가 )  
 가 Granovetter 가 --  
 -- (1982:  
 106). 가 가  
 , 가 가  
 Granovetter Erickson &  
 Yancey (1980)  
 Lin(1982) , (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn, 1981) 가  
 Blau and Duncan(1967)

---

(socioeconomic status) 가 . 가

가

. Bridges and Villemez(1986)

가

가

. Lee(1993)

가

(size)

(density)

가

가

(weak-tie network configuration)

가

가

가

가

가

(emergencies)

( , Lomnitz, 1977; Murray, Rankin,

and Magill, 1981; Wellman, 1979).

Granovetter(1982)

(Lomnitz ),

가

(Murray ),

가

(Wellman ),

가

(size)가

가

(strong ties)가

Bian(1997)

(job-assigning authorities)

가

가

가

가

(favor)

III.

가

1. :  
 - (worker-job matching)  
 :  
 , (search intensity: )가  
 가 가 (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997[1999]; 624-625).  
 , 가, 가 가,  
 가 - 가 가 . 가  
 가 (Granovetter, 1994,  
 1982; Lin, et. al., 1981; Lin, 1982)

“  
 (structural constraint model of job search)”  
 (embedded)  
 (Granovetter, 1985; Wellman, 1988).

4):  
 1) -- , (offer arrival rage) (wage  
 distribution) -- (e.g., Rees & Shultz, 1970)  
 (initial search)  
 가

2) ( ) (wage offer) ( )  
 (reservation wage) ,

3) 가  
 , 가  
 가 . ,  
 (expected return) 가

4) -- , 가 -- “ ” .  
 , , , 가 , , , --  
 , (embedded) -- ,

(search cost)

5)

(density, strength)가 , (size)가 , (social resource)가  
 가 가  
 가 , 가  
 가 , 가  
 가 (constraint)

2. 가

가 - (school-to-work transition)  
 가 (job-matching) (1997) , 1995  
 가 29% 23%,  
 57% 12%, 54% 21% ( ), 4 32% 15%  
 가 (Rosenbaum & Kariya, 1989; Kariya, 1998)  
 가 , 가  
 (job referral system)  
 가( , 1999:  
 757-758)

(1999)

centrality)

(2000) IMF (1998 )

, (intensity) ,  
 ( 가 가 )  
 .  
 ,  
 .  
 가  
 ( , ) 가  
 (Erickson & Yancey,1980; Lomnitz, 1977; Murray, Rankin, and Magill,  
 1981; Campbell, 1988; Campbell & Rosenfeld, 1985) . Granovetter(1982)  
 가  
 가  
 가

(Granovetter, 1982; Lin, 1982; Erkison & Yancey, 1980) .  
 (初入り) (direct  
 application) 가

가 가 1)  
 - (school-to-work transition)  
 가?, 2) 가 가  
 5)가 (size) (strength),  
 (social resources: Lin, 1982; Lin et. al., 1981 )

가  
 1) 가 , 가 가

---

5)  
 , (ego-centric networks)

- 2) 가 (intensity)가
- 3) 가 가 , , 가 가 ,
- 4) (入職 job-matching) , , 가 가 .
- 5) (job-matching quality), , , (human capital), (segmented labor market), 가
- 6) ( , , )가
- 7)
- 8)
- 9) 가
- 10) .가 . . 가 .
- 11) , , . ( =14)

## IV

### 1.

(initial labor market entry) , (KLIPS) 가 “3 ” “ (labor market entry) ” . 가 15 30 가 가 3 가 가

(social resources: Lin [1982], Lin, et. al. [1981] )  
[1994, 1982] )

(tie strength: Granovetter

(intensity) 가  
가 : 1)  
가 (3% ) , , 가 2000  
; 2) 2000 가 2000  
1995  
; 3) (3% ) .<sup>6) 4)</sup>  
1 .

2.

가. :

“ ” .  
15 30 (入社) 1985  
2000 (8 ) .  
(standardized)  
(standardized income) “  
” .  
(search intensity) .  
1 (探索日) (探索時間)  
(dummy) .<sup>7)</sup> “ ” .

1) : 가 가  
가 가

---

6) 가

7) 가 . Barron & Mellow (1979)  
(週) (日)

가 - - 4

2) : 가

(high status social resources) 8

8 “

” “ ” 가

: (1 ) ( )

( ) (2 )

3) (quality):

1 2 4 2

4) 가 : ( , ( , 14

)8), ( , ) ( , 14

) , , , 14

< 1>

(regression analysis) (logit analysis)

SAS(8.12)

< 1>

		( ) (%)
		(n=668) (n=762)
	( )	-0.02(1.01)
0.	( )	423 (55.5)
1.	3 + 2	0.20 (0.40) 215 (28.2)
2.	3 + 3	0.09 (0.30)
3.	4 + 2	0.09 (0.28) 124 (16.3)
4.	4 + 3	0.08 (0.28)

SES			
	0: ( )		35.4 (12.1)
	6- : 6	0.16 (0.36)	
	7+ : 7	0.08 (0.27)	
	(yrs. of schling)	13.60 (1.77)	13.57 (1.75)
		22.14 (2.92)	22.26 (2.86)
	(1= 0= )	0.43 (0.50)	0.46 (0.48)
	(1= 0= - )	0.76 (0.43)	
	0: ( )		
	: 가	0.33 (0.47)	
	:	0.41 (0.50)	
14	14 0:		101 (41.6)
	:	0.41 (0.50)	317 (31.5)
	:	0.34 (0.47)	240 (13.7)
	:	0.12 (0.33)	104 (13.3)
	0:		
	1: 3 - & 2 -	0.20 (0.40)	
	2: 3 - & 3 +	0.09 (0.30)	
	3: 4 + & 2 -	0.09 (0.28)	
	4: 4 + & 3 +	0.08 (0.28)	
	0: - -		
	:	0.23 (0.42)	
	:	0.49 (0.50)	
	:	0.20 (0.40)	
	:		
	/ / 0:		635 (83.3)
	1: 1 &	0.07 (0.26)	81 (10.6)
	2: 1 &	0.04 (0.20)	
	3: 2 + &	0.04 (0.20)	46 (6.1)
	4: 2 + &	0.02 (0.15)	
	(2 4 )	3.39 (0.90)	

: 1) 1 1 2 (= 3 )  
 3 3 4 (= 4 )  
 1 1 3 (= 1 )  
 3 3 4 (= 2 )  
 2) : 1, 2, 3 .

V.

1.

< 1 >

가  
/ /  
( 5% ) , , (知人)  
( 9% )

56% 45%

(social resource)

8

(strength)

8

가

(job entry) 3.4

57%

(years of schooling) 13.6

22

가 33%,

41%

26%

가

2.

:

< 2 >

가

1

-- 5 --

(baseline model)

< 2> :

			1		2 <sup>1)</sup>		3 <sup>1)</sup>	
				Beta		Beta		Beta
			-4.59 (0.40) ***	0.40	-4.60 (0.40) ***		-4.64 (0.40) ***	
	6-		-0.25 (0.10) **	-0.09	-0.25 (0.10) ***	-0.09	-0.26 (0.10) ***	-0.10
	7+		0.15 (0.13)	0.04	0.16 (0.13)	0.04	0.16 (0.13)	0.04
			0.17 (0.03) ***	0.29	0.17 (0.03) ***	0.29	0.16 (0.03) ***	0.29
			0.04 (0.02) ***	0.13	0.04 (0.02) ***	0.13	0.05 (0.02) ***	0.13
			0.36 (0.08) ***	0.18	0.35 (0.08) ***	0.17	0.34 (0.08) ***	0.17
			0.36 (0.08) ***	0.15	0.36 (0.08) ***	0.15	0.37 (0.08) ***	0.16
	-		0.18 (0.09) *	0.09	0.18 (0.09) *	0.09	0.20 (0.09) **	0.09
	-		0.24 (0.09) ***	0.12	0.24 (0.09) ***	0.12	0.26 (0.09) ***	0.13
14	-		0.25 (0.11) **	0.12	0.25 (0.11) **	0.12	0.24 (0.11) **	0.12
14	-		0.22 (0.11) **	0.10	0.22 (0.11) *	0.10	0.22 (0.11) *	0.10
14	-		0.54 (0.14) ***	0.18	0.54 (0.13) ***	0.18	0.57 (0.14) ***	0.19
1: 3	-2	-	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.02	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.02	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.02
2: 3	-3	+	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.02	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.02	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.02
3: 4	+2	-	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.02	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.02	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.01
4: 3	+3	+	-0.23 (0.12) *	-0.23	-0.23 (0.12) *	-0.06	-0.21 (0.14)	-0.06
	-		0.28 (0.14) **	0.28	0.29 (0.14) **	0.12	0.29 (0.14) **	0.12
	-		0.14 (0.13)	0.14	0.14 (0.13)	0.07	0.15 (0.13)	0.07
	-		0.00 (0.14)	0.00	0.00 (0.14)	0.00	0.01 (0.14)	0.00
	1: 1	/	0.28 (0.13) **	0.28	0.23 (0.11) **	0.07	0.16 (0.14)	0.05
	2: 1	/	0.16 (0.17)	0.16				
	3:2+	/	0.17 (0.17)	0.17	0.12 (0.13)	0.03	0.52 (0.23) **	0.13
	4:2+	/	0.02 (0.23)	0.02				
			0.12 (0.04) ***	0.12	0.12 (0.04) ***	0.11	0.12 (0.04) ***	0.11
	1*	1					0.20 (0.31)	0.02
	2*	1					0.04 (0.42)	0.00
	3*	1					0.38 (0.36)	0.04
	4*	1					0.00 (0.40)	0.00
	1*	2					-0.51 (0.35)	-0.07
	2*	2					-0.49 (0.38)	-0.06
	3*	2					-1.40 (0.50) ***	-0.11
	4*	2					-0.45 (0.46)	-0.04
			=668		=668		=668	
			R-sq=0.3184 ***		R-sq=0.3157 ***		R-sq=0.3270 ***	

1) 2- 3 1 1 2 , 1  
3 3 4 , 2 가

2) \* p < 0.1; \*\* p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01

3)

4) : 1, 2, 3 .

(original variable)

“ 가 3”

2 3  
 「 1」 , , 6 가  
 , 가  
 , 가  
 , 가

가  
 , , ,  
 ,  
 ) 가 (

, 가 ( ) , 가  
 (strength)

.10)  
 「 3」 가 , 가  
 , 가

---

9) “ 가 3”  
 , 가 5 4 가  
 가 1 2 (coefficient)  
 , 3

10) “ ” --  
 , 가 .  
 , 가 .  
 가 .

가 ( 1 4 \*  
 가 ( 1  
 1 )  
 4 \* 2 )  
 < 3>

< 3>

	( )
가	( )
가	( )
가	( )
가	( )

“ 가 3” , 가 < 4>  
 . < 4> 가 (reference) 가 가  
 ( 4 ) .  
 ( 3 )

< 4> : ( )

	M-L		Pr( / 4+ )	Pr( 3- / 4+ )
	DF	Chisq		
SES	2	22.06 ***	4.35 (1.00) ***	1.90 (1.10) *
	2	0.25	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
	2	27.47 ***	-0.26 (0.08) ***	0.08 (0.09)
	2	7.64 **	0.01 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.06) *
	2	1	0.11 (0.23)	0.25 (0.26)
14 1	6	23.64 ***	0.04 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.19)
	2		-0.24 (0.18)	0.16 (0.19)
	3		-0.10 (0.22)	-0.67 (0.27) **
0	4	7.61	0.20 (0.19)	0.10 (0.21)
1			-0.08 (0.24)	-0.57 (0.27) **
Maximum Likelihood Test			= 762	
DF: 1E3			-2LL1 = 1674.3	
Chisq: 1184.47 (p=0.82)			-2LL2 = 1418.5	

: 1, 2, 3 .

가 . , 가 < 5> ,  
 “ 가 3” . , 가  
 , 가 가 ,  
 가 가 . ,  
 가 .  
 가 ,

< 5> “ ” “ ” :

		1	2
	61.3%	63.2%	47.3%
3	24.0%	16.7%	37.0%
4	14.8%	20.2%	15.6%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

## VI.

-- - --  
 (search intensity) - 가  
 가 가?  
 “ ” 가  
 , 가  
 , 가  
 , 가  
 , 가  
 가 ,

가

가

가

가

가

(high SES)

가

(placement)

가 “ (trust)”

가 (e.g., Rosenbaum & Kariya, 1989; Kariya, 1988). (Canada)

IAS(Industrial Adjustment Services)

IMF

20 25%

(worker-job matching)

가

(Leigh, 1988)

- , 1999, 「 」, 『 』, 33 : 789-818
- , 1994, 「 」, 『 』, 17(2)
- , 2000, 「 - 」, 『 』, 34 71 : 531-564
- , 「 - 」, 『 (가) 』, 1999, 「 」, 『 』, 33 : 751-788
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