

⋮

*

가 : , :) (age cohort) ()
 가
 , 가
 가
 ()
 가
 가
 가
 가

I. :

.1) 가

*

1) (1988), (1999), (1975), (1993), (1999), (1985),
 (2000), (1992), (1991)

가
(Boudon, 1974; Kluegel and Smith, 1981).

(meritocratic achievement)
가 (ascriptive status)가

() ()
(Swell and Shah, 1967),
가
(e.g., Blau and Duncan, 1967;
Boudon, 1974; Collins, 1979; Lipset and Bendix, 1959; Sewell et. al., 1969).⁵⁾

가 가

· :
가 (Davis and Moore, 1945; Bendix and Lipset,
1966) 가 가
(가
) (,)
(status attainment model)
가 가
(e.g.,
Featherman and Hauser, 1978; Grusky and DiPrete, 1990; Hauser and Featherman,
1976; Hout, 1988).

가
(esp. Mare, 1980; 1981)

5) 가 (intervening
(Jencks et al., 1972), mechanism)
and Passeron, 1964, 1977; Bourdieu et al., 1974). (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu

가 , 가

가 가 가 (e.g., Boudon, 1974) 가

(Mare, 1981).⁶⁾

(가)

13 가 (Blossfeld and Shavit, 1993).

(Mare, 1980, 1981)

(logit)

(marginal progression rates)

(net background effect)

50% 100%

(,)

가

가

(Hout)

(e.g., Raftery and Hout, 1990; Hout, Raftery and Bell, 1993)

MMI(Maximally Maintained Inequality) ⁷⁾. MMI

() ()

. MMI

가

가 가

6) , (Mare, 1981)

7) MMI (Raftery and Hout, 1990) (Ireland)

()가 () 가
(odds ratio) .8)
(marginal transition rates) 가 ()
) (Mare, 1981)
(inter-cohort)
(, , 가,)
(Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). (->
), (,) ,
가
(Mare, 1980).
, ()
(sequence of stepwise selection/transition)
(Lucas,
2001) EMI(Effectively Maintained Inequality)
EMI
(tracking)
(destination state) (dropout)
(track) () , I[math], II[no math])
() ()
가 가
EMI 가 .9)

8) , (Hout, Raftery, and Bell, 1993: 35) . "In Ireland, (educational) inequalities persisted unchanged for at least forty years, ... because expansion at lower levels of the educational system and upgrading of continuing students' origin kept demand ahead of growth at advanced educational levels."

9 (Lucas, 2001: 1652)가 . , "Effectively maintained inequality posits that socioeconomically advantaged actors secure for themselves and their children some degree of advantage ... if quantitative differences are common, ... (they) will obtain quantitative advantage; ... if qualitative differences are common ... (they) will obtain qualitative advantage." (2002)

EMI 가 () 가

MMI 가 , MMI 가
가 (type of education),
EMI 가 (track selection) 가
가

(tracking) , EMI 가 ,
(effectively)
(maintained inequality) (Lucas, 2001: 1680).¹⁰⁾

가
가
가
(,)

(stability in educational stratification)

(differential selection effect) 가 ,
가 가
(unobserved variables) 가 (observed)
(Mare, 1980). , (life
course) 가 가 가
가 가 가
(Blossfeld and
Shavit, 1993; Lucas, 2001; Müller, 1990).¹¹⁾
가 가

10) EMI(effectively maintained inequality)
11) 가


EMI 가
 가 , (tracking)
 가, (:)가
 (, 2002; Lucas, 2001).¹²⁾

- 가 I: .
 .¹³⁾
- 가 II: () 가 .¹⁴⁾
- 가 III: () ()
- 가 IV: ,
 (:) ,
 (:) .¹⁵⁾

가 , (Mare, 1980)가
 (- >)
 (Lucas, 2001)가
 (‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’)

12) 가
 13) , 가 가
 14) ()
 15) 가 10 가

[1]



()

()

[1]

1.

가.

(KLIPS: Korea Labor and Income Panel Survey)

4 (2001)

. 4

10,607

323

10,284

3,620

6,664

OLS

가

< 1 >

	KLIPS 4	1, 0. 47.8%(4,920), 52.2%(5,364)
	KLIPS 4	30 29.8%(3,064), 31 40 21.6%(2,221) 41 50 19.4%(1,997), 51 29.2%(3,002)
1)	KLIPS 1 KLIPS 2-3	() = 6.36(5.09)
1)	KLIPS 4	() = 4.11(4.44)
	KLIPS 1 KLIPS 2-3	() () = 31.06(12.14)
	KLIPS 4 가 .	(0) () = 3.33(1.97)
가 2)	KLIPS 3 .	1, 0. 22.2%(2,084), 77.8%(7,293)
	KLIPS 1 KLIPS 2-3	14 가 1, 0. () 35.2%(3,506), 64.8%(6,452)
	KLIPS 4	1, 0. () 52.8%(3,590), 47.2%(3,210)
1)	KLIPS 4	() = 11.15(3.40)
	KLIPS 4	(reference group) 41.3%(4,246), 23.5%(2,418), 35.2%(3,620)
	KLIPS 4	(reference group) 29.1%(1,942), 14.0%(935), 56.8%(3,787)

1)

2)

milieux) (social
1996). (Fischer at al.,

(age cohort)
가
가 1969 2 (1971)
15.1% 가 1973
1979 (7) 1980 (8)
가 1970
1971 1975 5 4.7%
1976 1980 9.8%
1981 7 · 30 17).
가
가 . 4 2001 13 14
, 16 17 , 18 19 1970
46 47 1977 40 41
1985 36 37 .
30 (1972) , 31 40 (1971 1962), 41 50 (1963 1954), 50 (1953)
. < 1 >

2.

(multinomial logit model) .18)
3 (,)
(, ,)
 $\log(\pi_1 / \pi_3)$ $\log(\pi_2 / \pi_3)$
. , 가

17) 5 4
7. 30 1980 7 30 가
, , , , , ,
(, 1990: 119).
18) , 가
(OLS)

$$p_{ijt} = \frac{\pi_{ijt}}{1 + \pi_{ijt}} \quad , \quad \pi_{ijt} = \left(\frac{p_{ijt}}{1 - p_{ijt}} \right)^{\text{odds}}$$

(odds ratio)

$$X_{ijt} = y_{ijt} \beta_{jt}$$

(1)

$$Y_{ijt} = \log \left(\frac{\pi_{ijt}}{\pi_{ijt}} \right) = \alpha_t + \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \beta_{jt} x_{ijt} \quad j=1, \dots, J-1$$

(1)

$J-1$

α (parameter) β (regression parameter)

x , , , 가

, 14 () ,

i 가 $t-1$ t $k-1$ k

p_{ik} X_{ij} 가 p_{ik} . ,

$$\frac{\partial p_{ik}}{\partial X_{ij}} = \beta_j p_{ik} (1 - p_{ik})$$

(2)

(2) X 가 p $p=1/2$ 가 $1/4 \beta$

(Mare, 1981). (2) $(p \rightarrow 0.0)$

$(, p \rightarrow 1.0)$ β 0 가

$()$ X 가가

1. : OLS


$\langle 2 \rangle$

$(,)$ (saturated)

51 가 52% 가

30 31-40 95% .
 가 가 , 30 (93%) 51 (30%)
 가 63% .
 가 30% 30 가

[2]



MMI 가
 (upgrading) . < 2 >
 (父)
 (母) 가
 가(20→
 35→55%)
 가
 0-25%
 < 3 > 가 ()
) 가
 가 가
 가 가
 가 가
 가 가
 (upgrading) (homogeneity) 가

< 2>

	30	31 40	41 50	51
: (S.D.)				
(N=9,370)	10.01 (3.77)	7.07 (4.44)	5.26 (4.67)	2.60 (3.99)
(N=10,063)	8.12 (3.70)	4.39 (3.84)	2.45 (3.47)	0.87 (2.36)
(N=9,073)	36.38 (12.5)	31.14 (12.2)	29.65 (11.8)	26.92 (9.8)
(N=9,683)	1.96 (1.31)	3.56 (1.72)	4.21 (1.88)	4.07 (2.02)
: (%)				
가	530 (20.0)	520 (25.4)	451 (24.3)	583 (20.7)
(N=9,377)	2,124 (80.0)	1,531 (74.6)	1,405 (75.7)	2,233 (79.3)
	1,596 (55.3)	779 (35.4)	565 (28.4)	566 (19.6)
(N=9,958)	1,288 (44.7)	1,423 (64.6)	1,424 (71.6)	2,317 (80.4)

< 3> 가

	30	31 40	41 50	51
(N=9,423)				
	10.02 (3.77)	7.09 (4.44)	5.32 (4.67)	3.35 (4.29)
	8.13 (3.70)	4.40 (3.84)	2.48 (3.48)	1.14 (2.64)
	36.40 (12.5)	31.17 (12.2)	29.71 (11.8)	27.87 (10.8)
(N=6,664)				
	10.09 (3.72)	7.58 (4.33)	6.89 (4.66)	5.64 (4.80)
	8.21 (3.64)	4.86 (3.81)	3.57 (3.80)	2.28 (3.41)
	36.49 (12.5)	32.14 (12.7)	32.98 (13.7)	31.78 (13.8)
(N=2,877)				
	10.84 (3.54)	9.04 (4.51)	8.95 (4.88)	6.54 (5.23)
	8.86 (3.40)	6.30 (3.74)	5.15 (4.21)	3.378(3.95)
	39.03 (13.3)	36.71 (14.5)	39.70 (15.8)	34.75 (16.4)

< 4>

OLS

가

30

가

(+→-) .19)

< 4> () OLS

		30	31 40	41 50	51	
가		.146(.205)***	.050(.094)**	.094(.163)***	.151(.219)***	.222(.266)***
		.162(.190)***	.085(.155)***	.177(.264)***	.201(.218)***	.247(.175)***
		.020(.070)***	.019(.113)***	.016(.075)**	.027(.100)***	.027(.081)**
		.051(.029)**	-.063(-.048)	.004(.003)	-.007(-.004)	.071(.035)*
		1.140(.139)***	.494(.097)**	.891(.151)***	1.322(.176)***	1.435(.173)***
		.374(.051)***	-.132(-.034)	.308(.057)*	.574(.080)**	.782(.089)***
		1.269(.187)***	-.026(-.006)	1.083(.214)***	1.303(.208)***	2.156(.313)***
30		2.872(.342)***				
31 40		2.768(.364)***				
41 50		1.475(.188)***				
		6.195***	11.643***	9.752***	7.513***	4.987***
R ²		.476	.115	.281	.342	.343
Adjusted R ²		.475	.110	.278	.339	.340
N		5,886	1,207	1,598	1,451	1,630

: 1) (β) .
 2) † P < .10 * P < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001

19) R²
 →.28→.11)

2.

< 5>

. < 1>
 가 , 가 30
 50%
 100% ' , 2.5%
 가 : 51 5:3 30 가
 2:1 가
 10:1 10:6
 가

< 5>

(: ; %)

	30	31 40	41 50	51
()	(N=10,284)			
	1,954(63.8)	1,141(51.4)	698(35.0)	453 (15.1)
	1,033(33.7)	739(33.3)	375(18.8)	271 (9.0)
	77(2.5)	341(15.4)	924(46.2)	2,278 (75.9)
	3,064(100)	2,221(100)	1,997(100)	3,002 (100)
	(N=6,664)			
	980(32.8)	513(27.3)	240(22.4)	209(28.9)
	592(19.8)	240(12.8)	83(7.7)	20(2.8)
	1,415(47.4)	1,127(59.9)	750(69.9)	495(68.4)
	2,987(100)	1,880(100)	1,073(100)	724(100)

< 6>

(goodness of fit)

(,) 가 가
 가 ()
 2- 8) (9- 4) 가 .

가
), AC*FE(*), AC*FO(*)
 (df.) (N) BIC⁽²⁰⁾ AC*SX,
 AC*FE 가 9가
 (BIC = 4882.947; d.f.=32).

< 6>

	-2LL			BIC ⁽¹⁾
1 : SX+FE+ME+FO+SI+SC+MT+AC	7630.176	4839.453	20	4762.411
2 : 1+AC*SX	7529.500	4940.129	26	4839.974
3 : 1+AC*FE	7575.913	4893.716	26	4793.561
4 : 1+AC*ME	7604.105	4865.524	26	4765.369
5 : 1+AC*FO	7584.565	4885.064	26	4784.909
6 : 1+AC*SIB	7619.140	4850.489	26	4750.334
7 : 1+AC*SC	7603.543	4866.086	26	4765.931
8 : 1+AC*MT	7613.752	4855.877	26	4755.722
9 : 2+AC*FE	7463.414	5006.215	32	4882.947
10 : 9+AC*MT	7451.646	5017.983	38	4871.603
11 : 10+AC*FO	7434.655	5034.974	44	4865.481
12 : 11+AC*SIB	7427.055	5042.574	50	4849.968
13 : 12+AC*SC	7405.182	5064.447	56	4848.729
14 : 13+AC*MT	7389.533	5080.096	62	4841.265

1) $BIC^* = Model \chi^2 - (model \text{ d.f.}) \times \ln(N)$.

* SX , FE , ME , FO , SIB , SC 가 , MT 14
 , AC .

20) (Raftery, 1986)
 BIC(Bayesian Information Criterion)

(Treiman and Yamaguchi, 1993)

< 7 >

가
 가 1
 1.17 (=exp(0.16))
 1.05 (=exp(0.05)) , 가
 가 가
 가 1950
 가

< 7 >


	1		
	/	/	/
(FE)	0.16(0.01)***	0.11(0.01)***	0.05(0.01)***
(ME)	0.21(0.01)***	0.14(0.01)***	0.07(0.01)***
(FO)	0.03(0.01)***	0.01(0.01)	0.02(0.03)
(SIB)	0.02(0.02)	0.05(0.02)*	-0.03(0.02)
가 (SC) (=1)	1.17(0.10)***	0.81(0.11)***	0.36(0.08)***
(MT) (=1)	0.31(0.10)**	0.41(0.09)***	-0.10(0.07)
(SX) (=1)	1.14(0.08)***	1.13(0.08)***	0.01(0.06)
(AC) ¹⁾			
30	3.51(0.19)***	3.99(0.20)***	-0.48(0.13)***
31 40	2.26(0.12)***	2.50(0.12)***	-0.24(0.12)*
41 50	0.95(0.11)***	0.91(0.11)***	-0.04(0.13)
	-4.29(0.19)***	-3.71(0.19)***	-3.71(0.19)***
N()	7,114		
-2LL	7630.176		
Pseudo R ² (Nagelkerke)	0.558		

: 1) 51
 * (S. E.) . † P < .10 * P < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001

		30	31 40	41 50	51
(FE)	/	.108(0.05) [*]	.125(0.02) ^{***}	.122(0.02) ^{***}	.207(0.02) ^{***}
	/	.005(0.05)	.085(0.02) ^{***}	.104(0.02) ^{***}	.183(0.02) ^{***}
	/	.103(0.02) ^{***}	.040(0.02) [†]	.018(0.02)	.024(0.02)
(ME)	/	.235(0.05) ^{***}	.226(0.03) ^{***}	.171(0.02) ^{***}	.203(0.03) ^{***}
	/	.181(0.05) ^{**}	.151(0.03) ^{***}	.128(0.03) ^{***}	.217(0.04) ^{***}
	/	.054(0.02) [*]	.076(0.02) ^{***}	.042(0.02) [†]	-.014(0.03)
2) (FO)	/	-.013(0.02)	.036(0.01) ^{**}	.026(0.01) ^{**}	.017(0.01) [*]
	/	-.042(0.02) [*]	.012(0.01)	.019(0.01) [*]	.016(0.01) [†]
	/	.030(0.05) ^{***}	.024(0.01) ^{***}	.007(0.07)	.002(0.08)
(SIB)	/	-.196(0.11) [†]	.025(0.05)	-.014(0.04)	.072(0.04) [†]
	/	-.152(0.11)	.046(0.05)	-.003(0.04)	.020(0.04)
	/	-.044(0.04)	-.021(0.04)	-.011(0.04)	.053(0.05)
가 (=1) (SC)	/	.048(0.44)	1.226(0.25) ^{***}	1.065(0.17) ^{***}	1.073(0.17) ^{***}
	/	-.674(0.45)	.859(0.26) ^{**}	.833(0.19) ^{***}	1.259(0.39) ^{***}
	/	.722(0.15) ^{***}	.367(0.14) ^{**}	.233(0.17)	-.185(0.20)
(=1) (LC)	/	.121(0.35)	.042(0.20)	.257(0.17)	.763(0.18) ^{***}
	/	.365(0.35)	.030(0.20)	.553(0.18) ^{**}	.308(0.22)
	/	-.244(0.11) [*]	.012(0.14)	-.296(0.17) [*]	.455(0.22) [*]
(SX) (=1)	/	-.200(0.33)	.706(0.17) ^{***}	.763(0.14) ^{***}	1.633(0.17) ^{***}
	/	-.513(0.33)	.604(0.16) ^{***}	1.236(0.16) ^{***}	2.912(0.26) ^{***}
	/	.313(0.10) ^{**}	.102(0.12)	-.472(0.16) ^{**}	-1.278(0.28) ^{***}
(C)	/	1.792(0.75) [*]	-2.022(0.40) ^{***}	-2.664(0.28) ^{***}	-4.737(0.31) ^{***}
	/	3.699(0.75) ^{***}	-.970(0.39) [*]	-3.124(0.32) ^{***}	-5.702(0.40) ^{***}
	/	-1.907(0.25) ^{***}	-1.051(0.26) ^{***}	.460(0.38)	.965(0.41) [*]
N()		2,069	1,620	1,469	1,956
-2 Log Likelihood		2216.374	2088.249	1808.783	1276.127
Pseudo-R ² (Nagelkerke)		0.193	0.228	0.298	0.405

: (S. E.) . † P < .10 * P < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001

[4] $P(\quad / \quad) \quad \exp(\beta)$



[5], [6], [7] < 8>
 가 (FE), (FO), (SC)


OLS

OLS $\beta(FE)$, $\beta(FO)$, $\beta(SC)$


51 가
 [6] $\beta(FO)$ [6]
 $\beta(SC)$

가
 가


[5] OLS, Multinomial Logit (FE)



[6] OLS, Multinomial Logit (FO)



[7] OLS, Multinomial Logit 가 (SC)



OLS
100%

([3]

가

가

()

가

3. () ()

< 9>

가 (CA) (2- 8)
 (9- 14) 가 .
 가 가 가 (AC*FE),
 (AC*ME), (AC*FO)
 (df.) (N) BIC*
 AC*SX, AC*FE, AC*ME 10
 (BIC* = 829.396; d.f.=38).

< 9> ()

	-2LL			BIC ^{*1)}
1 : SX+FE+ME+FO+SIB+SC+HL+AC	6705.000	847.809	20	774.492
2 : 1+AC*SX	6634.627	918.647	26	823.335
3 : 1+AC*FE	6685.648	867.626	26	772.314
4 : 1+AC*ME	6681.775	871.499	26	776.187
5 : 1+AC*FO	6689.053	864.221	26	768.909
6 : 1+AC*SI	6693.530	859.744	26	764.432
7 : 1+AC*SC	6699.023	854.251	26	758.939
8 : 1+AC*HL	6687.020	866.254	26	770.942
9 : 2+AC*FE	6611.020	941.844	32	824.536
10 : 9+AC*ME	6584.575	968.699	38	829.396
11 : 10+AC*FO	6577.305	975.969	44	814.671
12 : 11+AC*SI	6573.689	979.585	50	796.292
13 : 12+AC*SC	6567.336	985.938	56	780.650
14 : 13+AC*HL	6549.961	1003.312	62	776.029

1) BIC^{*} = Model χ^2 - (model d.f.) \times ln(N).

* SX , AC , FE , ME , FO , SI , SC 가 , HL .

< 10> (:)

< 7> 가

< 11>

가

< 10> ()

	1		
	/	/	/
(FE)	0.05(0.01)***	0.02(0.02)	0.03(0.02)*
(ME)	0.09(0.01)***	0.03(0.02)*	0.05(0.02)**
(FO)	0.02(0.00)***	0.02(0.00)***	0.01(0.01)
(SIB)	0.01(0.02)	-0.06(0.03)†	0.07(0.03)†
가 (SC) (=1)	0.68(0.08)***	0.45(0.11)***	0.23(0.11)*
(HL) (=1)	0.32(0.08)***	-0.03(0.09)	0.34(0.10)*
(SX) (=1)	0.75(0.08)***	0.05(0.09)	0.70(0.10)***
(AC) ¹⁾			
30	0.02(0.15)	2.46(0.38)***	-2.44(0.39)***
31 40	0.03(0.14)	2.08(0.37)***	-2.05(0.38)***
41 50	0.03(0.14)	1.49(0.39)***	-1.84(0.40)***
	-3.26(0.21)***	-4.50(0.42)***	1.24(0.44)**
N()	4,633		
-2LL	6705.465		
Pseudo R ² (Nagelkerke)	0.197		

: 1)


51
(S. E.) . † P < .10 * P < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001

		30	31 40	41 50	51
	/	.084(0.21) ^{***}	.067(0.02) ^{**}	.055(0.03) [†]	-.082(0.08)
	/	.023(0.23)	.028(0.03)	.035(0.04)	-.082(0.08)
	/	.060(0.26) [*]	.039(0.03)	.019(0.04)	.055(0.08)
	/	.019(0.02)	.160(0.03) ^{***}	.074(0.03) [*]	.097(0.03) ^{**}
	/	.006(0.02)	.086(0.03) ^{**}	.049(0.04)	-.045(0.12)
	/	.014(0.02)	.074(0.03) [†]	.026(0.04)	.142(0.13)
2)	/	.028(0.01) ^{***}	.019(0.01) ^{**}	.032(0.01) ^{***}	.018(0.01) [*]
	/	.015(0.01) ^{**}	.030(0.01) ^{***}	.023(0.01) [†]	.036(0.12)
	/	.012(0.01) [†]	-.011(0.01)	.001(0.01)	-.019(0.02)
	/	-.022(0.05)	.005(0.05)	.012(0.05)	.015(0.05)
	/	-.031(0.05)	-.060(0.06)	-.184(0.08) [*]	-.058(0.18)
	/	.009(0.06)	.065(0.06)	-.196(0.09) [*]	.073(0.19)
가	/	.532(0.14) ^{***}	.723(0.16) ^{***}	.976(0.21) ^{***}	.731(0.22) ^{**}
(=1)	/	.302(0.16) [†]	.430(0.19) [*]	.802(0.30) ^{**}	1.713(0.85) [*]
	/	.229(0.16)	.293(0.20)	.174(0.32)	-.982(0.87)
(=1)	/	.003(0.11)	.561(0.15) ^{***}	.405(0.21) [*]	.845(0.23) ^{***}
	/	-.224(0.12) [†]	.095(0.18)	.161(0.29)	.398(0.76)
	/	.226(0.14) [†]	.466(0.20) [*]	.245(0.32)	.447(0.78)
(=1)	/	.178(0.11)	1.538(0.16) ^{***}	1.172(0.23) ^{***}	.808(0.30) ^{**}
	/	-.422(0.13)	.717(0.18) ^{***}	.931(0.31) ^{**}	-1.508(0.79) [†]
	/	.600(0.14) ^{***}	.821(0.20) ^{***}	.241(0.35)	2.315(0.82) ^{**}
	/	-2.651(0.27) ^{***}	-4.199(0.35) ^{***}	-4.338(0.45) ^{***}	-3.012(0.48) ^{***}
	/	-1.425(0.29) ^{***}	-3.452(0.39) ^{***}	-3.567(0.59) ^{***}	-4.426(1.45) ^{**}
	/	-1.226(0.32) ^{***}	-.746(0.43) [†]	-.771(0.66)	1.413(1.48)
N()		2,023	1,372	761	477
-2 Log Likelihood		3266.059	1871.829	928.485	483.588
Pseudo-R ² (Nagelkerke)		0.105	0.266	0.242	0.184


: (S. E.) . [†] P < .10 ^{*} P < .05 ^{**} P < .01 ^{***} P < .001

[8] $(\exp(\beta))$, [9] $(\exp(\beta))$ ([2])
 가 (父) (母) 가 30
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 51 가
 가 ([9]),
 가

[8] P(/) $\exp(\beta)$




[9] P(/) $\exp(\beta)$




[10], [11], [12] < 11>
 가 (FE), (FO), (SC)
 OLS
 OLS [10], $\beta(FE)$ 가
 , , 가
 . [11] $\beta(FO)$ [12] (FO)
 $\beta(SC)$.
 51 30 가


[10] OLS, Multinomial Logit (FE)



[11] OLS, Multinomial Logit (FO)



[12] OLS, Multinomial Logit 가 (SC)



가 (SC) OLS 가

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1978- 1988)

(differential selection) 가 (life course)가 가


.22)

가 (2002) 30

< 12> 가 : AC=31-40


	$\beta(\text{FE})(\quad)$	$\beta(\text{FO})(\quad)$	$\beta(\text{SC})(\quad)$
LG(/)	0.125	0.036	1.226
LG(/)	0.04	0.024	0.367
LG(/)	0.067	0.019	0.723
LG(/)	0.039	-0.011	0.293

[13] (FE) (FO) : AC=31-40



22) MMI 가

[14] 가 (SC) : AC=31-40



가 , 가 I , , OLS , 가 II , , 가 III , () 가 IV , () , 가 가 가 (Mare, 1980, 1981) , (Hout, Raftery and Bell, 1993) 23) , , (2002) 가

23 Shavit and Blossfeld(1993), eds. 「Persistent Inequality: Changing Educational Attainment in Thirteen Countries」 13

가 , 가
(Mare, 1993)가 (unobserved variables)
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